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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
TITANIUM M E T A L S CORPORATION OF AMERICA, A DELAWARE CORPORATION,
Plaintiff,
vs.
SPACE METALS, INC., a Corporation,
and VALLEY BANK AND TRUST
COMPANY, a Utah Corporation,
Defendants.

Case No.
13474

APPELLANTS' REPLY BRIEF
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE
This is a suit by the plaintiff-respondent against the
defendant-appellant Bank in contract on a letter of credit.
DISPOSITION BY LOWER COURT
The matter was tried before the Third Judicial District Court, sitting without a jury. The Honorable Joseph G. Jeppson rendered a judgment in favor of the
plaintiff, Titanium Metals Corporation of America, and
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against appellant, for the sum of $54,132.72 and costs of
$22.00. The court found as a matter of fact and law that
defendant Valley Bank and Trust Company, had obligated
itself under a letter of credit and had waived certain conditions thereof.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant-Appellant, Valley Bank and Trust Company seeks reversal of the judgment.
SUPPLEMENTARY STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Respondent's statement of the facts is essentially
correct, however, several points need clarification.
First, Respondent's Brief, is not clear on the critical
point that three separate letters of either guarantee or
credit were issued by Valley Bank and Trust Company
to Titanium Metals Corporation of America.
A. The first letter guaranteed the payment of
invoices. All invoices submitted by Titanium Metals
to Valley Bank under this letter were paid.
B. The second letter of credit differed in its
terms from the first letter of credit and agreed to
pay all collection drafts. It did not agree to pay invoices. Titanium continued to send invoices. The
Bank never paid on an invoice covered by this letter
of credit.
C. The third letter of credit issued by the Bank
also agreed to pay collection drafts. Titanium con-
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tinned to send invoices. This first invoice under this
third letter of credit was paid by Space Metals, Inc.,
after Valley Bank sent it to Space Metals and refused to pay it. The remaining six invoices were returned by the Bank without payment.
None of the invoices were accompanied by a collection draft or collection drafts, nor were any drafts with
respect thereto furnished to Appellants at any other time.
The record is clear on this point.
In his statement of the facts, Respondent contends
thai, "at no time did Valley Bank and Trust Company
notify Titanium Metals that the procedure which it was
utilizing in the sending of invoices to Valley Bank was
improper and that such procedure should be remedied
or altered to conform to a diffirent banking procedure
and particularly that formal commercial drafts should be
presented in order to collect for the shipments." It is
clear from this statement by Respondent that he assumes
that Valley Bank had a duty to inform the Plaintiff Corporation that they were using an improper procedure.
This assumption is erroneous. Titanium knew the proper
procedure from the letter of credit. Also, Respondent's
statement that Valley Bank did not give them any notice
that the procedure was not satisfactory is incorrect.
This is belied by the facts. The only invoice paid under
the third letter of credit was paid by Space Metals, Inc.,
not by the Bank. This certainly constitutes notice that
the Bank is not paying upon presentation of invoices.
The invoices were not paid on receipt as would occur
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in relation to a draft on the letter of credit. The invoices
were returned unpaid. The conduct and advice in conjunction with the clearly stated terms of the letters of
credit put Titanium on notice that collection drafts, not
merely invoices were required, and that invoices would
not be treated like drafts.
It is obvious from the record that Titanium's personnel had the sophistication necessary to be aware of
what constitutes a draft and of how a draft differs from
an invoice. The Court in questioning Titanium's witness
asked the following question: "And what is a draft, do
you know, in your business? Or would we have to ask
a banker?" (R-148). And the Answer was as follows:
"Well, we do use drafts in our business. A draft is a check
drawn on a customer, drawn by us, which the Bank accepts and remits" (R-148).
Respondent further contends that receipt of the
drafts by Valley Bank and Trust Company was not essential and that if drafts; had been received they would
have been treated in the same way as invoices. Testimony in the record, which was previously cited in Appellants' Brief, makes it clear that this was not then, and
is not now, the case. Valley Bank and Trust Company's
cashier testified that if drafts had been received, "we
would have paid the draft and notified the customer"
(R-200). This entire law suit has, as its reason for being,
the fact that the invoices were not treated this way.
Obviously, when invoices were presented under the second and third letters of credit, Valley Bank and Trust
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Company did not pay themjaMHrlt mmp the customer
of the receipt of the invoice and mmb me customer's direction. If the invoices had been paid Titanium would
not be bringing this action, because they would have the
money they are now seeking.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING
THAT APPELLANT WAIVED THE TERMS
OF THE LETTER OF CREDIT, BECAUSE
THERE IS NO EVIDENCE OF WAIVER.
Respondent's Brief states that there is a surfeiture
of evidence establishing Valley Bank's waiver. The Brief
reads:
"The record is replete with statements by Bank
officials which clearly support the lower Court's
finding that the Bank did in fact waive strict
compliance with the letter of credit in issue . . ."
Not surprisingly, Respondent fails to point out any
specific sitatements in the record which support this
stand. Obviously, Respondent is unable to find any such
references.
The case of Phoenix Insurance Company v. Heath,
et al, 90 Utah 87, 61 P. 2d 308 (1936), which was cited
in Appellant's Brief, is examined by Respondent in his
Brief. Respondent briefly relates the facts in Phoenix,
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and states that the facts are very different from those
in the instant case. The differences spoken of are not
specified because fundamentally there are none. Actually, the situation in Phoenix is very similar to our
situation, in that in both the case of Phoenix Insurance
Company and of Valley Bank and Trust Company, there
was never the slightest manifestation of an intent to
waive any requirement. Respondent seams to feel that
when the Court in Phoenix stated:
"a waiver is an intentional relinquishment of a
known right, (citation) To constitute a waiver,
there must be an existing right, benefit, or advantage, a knowledge of this existence, and an
intention to relinquish it. It must be distinctly
made, although it may be express or implied
(citation)," (Emphasis added.)
that the language express or implied is helpful to his
cause, but Appellant is not refuting the fact that waiver
may be express or implied. However, in our case, there
was no distinct waiver made, either express or implied.
Waiver cannot be found where there was:
1. No intent.
2. No distinct conduct which either impliedly
or expressly waived the requirement of a
draft.
Respondent implies that Valley Bank and Trust Company had an affirmative duty to act, i.e. to give detailed
prompt notice to Titanium that drafts were required.
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Further, Respondent urges that since Valley Bank had
this duty, its failure to give prompt detailed notice constituted an inference of intent to waive and constituted
an implied waiver. Valley Bank and Trust Company had
no affirmative duty to tell Titanium that their procedure,
of submitting an invoice instead of a draft, was improper.
The letters of credit were clear as to proper procedure.
Valley Bank and Trust Company had already spoken
on this subject of proper procedure when it conditionally
extended credit in its letters.
Titanium Metals Corporation is not an artless or
simple person thrown into a commercial jungle; but a
sophisticated corporation of experts that commonly used
Letters of Credit, Drafts, COD shipments, and other
facets of the Law Merchant in conducting its Multi-State
operations (R-148, et seq.). This corporation could have
requested a change of the conditions, but it did not.
The only communications between the corporations
were:
1. The Letters of Credit.
2. Copies of Sales Orders marked "Invoice
Copy" indicating payment within 30 days.
3. Valley Bank's advice indicating receipt of
invoices acknowledging Titanium's instruction to "Hold 30 days".
4. Returned invoices accompanied by a cashier's check purchased by Space Metals (so
indicated on face of check) or Valley Bank's
advice "we return herewith unpaid".
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Respondent contends that VaJley Bank did not act
immediately to inform Titanium of the existence of a
problem and of its discontent. Respondent states, "Valley
Bank and Trust Company never9 during the entire period
in question, defined its position, expressed any discont e n t " This statement is completely falacious. As discussed above, VaJley Bank and Trust Company had expressed ite position permanently and unambiguously in
writings which Titanium had in its possession, i.e. the
letters of credit.
A draft on the Letters of Credit is a demand on the
Bank and would have resulted in immediate credit.
Titanium elected to charge the customer (Space
Metals) and not the Bank and to extend 30 days credit
to the customer.
Is it the Bank's duty to say "Don't charge the customer or extend it credit — charge me"? Obviously not,
for Titanium may have been reserving the Bank credit
line for later use and it certainly is not the prerogative of
the Bank to tell a non-customer when to use a line of
credit.
The Bank clearly indicated that it was not accepting
these items by:
1. Not paying them immediately as required by
the letters of credit.
2. Sending an advice indicating receipt of "Invoke" or "Sales Draft".
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3. Payment when remitted was indicated as
being "Space Metal's Funds" not Bank funds
on the check.
4. The advices reflected Titanium Metal's Instructions, "Hold for 30 days".
Respondent indicates in his Brief that something
more should have been done by Valley Bank. There is
no authority for this belief. Neither case law nor statutory authority is cited to establish a rule requiring Appellant to do more in this situation. Nor did the letters of
credit state that Appellants had an obligation to do more
than they did.
It seems clear, that the reason Respondent does not
cite any authority for this proposition is that there is no
obligation on Valley Bank to do more than they did. Valley Bank did not fail to meet its obligations, it strictly
followed the terms of the letters of credit. There was no
conduct on Valley Bank's part which either impliedly or
expressly waived the requirements of a draft.
Reynolds v. Travelers Insurance Company, 176 Wash.
36, 28 P. 2d 310, 314 (1934), which is cited in Respondent's Brief, says that waiver is unilateral and arises by
intentional relinquishment of a right. This is in keeping
with the holdings of other cases in the area of waiver,
including the Phoenix case. There is no indication in
the Reynolds case that the facts in the present case
would constitute an intention to waive.
There was no course of conduct pursued by Valley
Bank and Trust Company, which evidences an intention
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to waive. Respondent states, on page 17 of his Brief,
that, "the trial court clearly looked at the conduct of the
Appellant as evidenced by the record" and based their
determination on that conduct. However, Respondent
never makes it clear to what conduct he is referring. There
was no conduct on Valley Bank's part that indicated an
intention to waive. This seems to be the reason why Respondent does not pin point any conduct.
Respondent states that Valley Bank waived strict
compliance by "issuing and forwarding its drafts purchased by Space Metals totaling more than $19,000 on
a similar letter of credit covering an earlier period as
evidenced by the first invoices shipment covered by the
letter of credit." Respondent simply misstates the facts
in this conclusion. Valley Bank did not issue any drafts
but merely forwarded to Titanium checks purchased by
Space Metals, Inc., which so indicated the purchaser.
Respondent illustrates no facts constituting "waiver",
nor does he even attempt to show facts indicating "Intention to Waive" or cite any cases involving similar facts
and holding for waiver.
There is no fact in the record upon which the court
could base a finding of waiver, and since this is the ultimate basis of the District Court decisions, the decision
must fall.
POINT II.
STRICT COMPLIANCE WITH THE TERMS
OF THE LETTER OF CREDIT SHALL NOT
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BE WAIVED WHERE THERE IS NO CLEAR
MANIFESTATION OF AN INTENT TO
WAIVE.
In Respondent's Brief, he implies that since the
drafters of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) expressed a belief in flexibility and the importance of liberal
interpretation, and since the UCC provisions are broad
in scope, one cannot form any hard and fast rules in
dealing with any situation covered by the provisions of
the UCC. This is a ridiculous argument. The UCC
clearly has flexibility, but, this does not mean that there
are no rules established by the Code upon which a court
can rely. As stated in Appellants' Brief, "Uniform Law
Annotated", a West publishing company consolidation
of the various Uniform Commercial Codes, sets forth the
Rule on interpretation of letters of credit. That rule is
as follows, "Generally — essential requirements of a letter
of credit must be strictly complied with". (Section 5-104
Note 1; Section 5-103 Note 1.) The purpose behind the
requirement of strict compliance with the terms of a letter
of credit is the promotion of easy, uncomplicated, and
beneficial commercial transactions. When two people
can enter into an agreement, i.e. a letter of credit agreement, and can rely upon the terms of that letter of credit
in the conducting of their business, commercial transactions progress more easily and expeditiously.
Respondent cites the case of Consolidated Sales Company, Inc. v. Bank of Hampton Roads, 193 Va. 307, 68
68 S. E. 2d 652 (1952), which held that the Defendant
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Bank by its conduct had waived strict compliance with
the terms of the letters of credit involved.
In that case, the Plaintiff began to make sales to the
Bank's customer and he attached the requested draft to
each of the first seven invoices submitted to the Bank
for payment. Subsequently, some eighteen to twenty
shipments were made by the Plaintiff and the Defendant
Bank made payments for these shipments upon mere
submission of invoices without drafts. The Court held,
". . . by continuing to make payments upon receipt of
the invoices alone, the bank had waived the provision in
the letter which specified and had therefore required
that a draft accompany the invoice." In our situation,
the Bank did not continue to make payments under the
second and third letters of credit when mere invoices
were sent. Under the first letter of credit, which required
only that invoices be sent, the Bank paid the invoices.
Under the second and third letters of credit, where drafts
were required, no invoices were paid. If an invoice were
paid, Space Metals paid it, not the Bank.
Richard v. Royal Bank of Canada, 23 F. 2d 430 (2d
Cir. 1928), was also cited in Respondent's Brief. This
case also involved lettens of credit. However, under the
letters of credit in Ric/iard the drawing of drafts was
not required. As the Count pointed out, the sending of
drafts was assumed from the general language of the
letter of credit, but was not required. Also, in Richard
the Bank upon receipt of the documents (the documents
were sent without drafts), made many payments. In
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our case, Valley Bank never made payments under the
terms of the second and third letters of credit when mere
invoices were presented.
Respondent's Brief states that a letter of credit shall
be construed in the light most favorable to the recipient
and that where there is ambiguity, the ambiguity shall
be resolved in favor of the recipient.
The case of Venizelos, S. A. v. Chase Manhattan
Bank, 425 F. 2d 461, (2d Cir. 1917), is cited to substantiate this point. Venizelos upholds the well known principal that it is preferable to construe an instrument so as
to sustain it rather than so as to defeat it, if an instrument is "fairly capable" of being so construed. Here, there
is no ambiguity in the letters of credit. The terms in the
letters of credit involved are explicit and clear. The
letters of credit in this case are not "fairly susceptible"
to two constructions. There is only one possible construction and it requires Titanium Metals Corp. to submit drafts.
POINT III.
WAIVER WAS NOT PLED, THEREFORE
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING
THAT THE APPELLANT, VALLEY BANK
AND TRUST COMPANY, WAIVED THE
TERMS OF THE LETTER OF CREDIT.
The whole purpose of the rules of pleading is to put
the other side on notice of the theory upon which you
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are relying. The rationale behind this rule can be easily
understood. It is essential that each party be able to
prepare effectively to meet the arguments of each other
party. Here that kind of preparation was not possible.
There was no way in which Appellant could anticipate
and deal with the question of waiver since the issue was
never pled nor averred to, during the course of the law
suit. Waiver, in the present case, should have been pled
so that Appellant, Valley Bank and Trust Company,
could have dealt with this subject. It is clear on the facts
that no conduct by Valley Bank and Trust Company
constituted either an express or an implied waiver. However, evidence on this matter was never really considered
because of the fact that waiver was never put into issue
by the pleadings.
The case of Commercial Standard Insurance Company v. Remay, 72 P. 2d 859 (1937), makes it clear that
the Court won't take judicial notice of waiver if it is not
pled.
It is clear under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
that Appellant had no obligation to specifically mention
waiver even if the opportunity had been present. Appellant's Motion for new trial was broad enough in scope
to cover Appellant's dissatisfaction with how waiver was
handled. It is also apparent that Appellant's Motion to
amend or alter findings of fact and conclusions of law
covered the question of waiver and notified the Court
and Respondent of Appellant's objection to the lack of
pleadings of waiver.
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The first discussion of waiver as a reason for recovery
was at the time of preparation of the Findings of Fact
and this is too late.
Respondent also contends that there was testimony
given to support the conclusion that the parties had
"agreed" to a certain course of conduct, i.e. sending invoices instead of the requisite drafts, which Appellant
now deems improper. Respondent goes on to say that
Appellant, "should not be allowed mr alter the terms of
the agreement which it voluntarily entered into and
which later proved not to be in its best economic interest". The only agreement Appellant had with Respondent was the agreement laid out in the letters of credit.
Appellant is not seeking to alter the terms of this agreement, rather Appellant is seeking to enforce the terms
of the agreement. Appellant never agreed to any substitution for the terms in the letters of credit. In short,
the terms of the letters of credit establish the agreement
between Appellant and Respondent, and these terms
require strict compliance.
POINT IV.
WHERE IT APPEARS CLEAR THAT THE
COURT HELD ON A THEORY NEITHER
PLED, REVEALED, OR SUPPORTED BY
THE EVIDENCE, THE TRIAL COURT'S
JUDGMENT MUST BE OVERTURNED.
The authority which was cited by Respondent in
support of the idea that there is a presumption that the
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Judgment of the trial court is correct, is not disputed
by Appellant. However, where it appears, as it does
here, that a court held on a theory not pled or revealed,
the Trial Court's Judgment must be overturned. Appellant had no notice of the theory upon which the court
was relying until the court came out with its findings
and Appellant immediately objected thereto.
The case of Buckley v. Cox, 122 Utah 151, 247 P.
2d 277 (1952), was cited by Respondent, and the law
it states is probably applicable to our situation. The
court in Buckley v. Cox made the following determination, "the question is whether the decision made by the
trial court finds support in the evidence." Here the decision finds no support in the evidence. Respondent claims
that a "substantial amount of evidence in support of the
trial court's decision" is present. Yet, he never says what
this evidence is or where the evidence can be found in
the record. Respondent does not allude to even one
page in the record where this evidence can be found.
Appellant has successfully met the burden of overcoming
the presumption that the trial court's decision was correct. Appellant has made it clear that there was no evidence at all in the record which showed waiver. Thus,
from Respondent's own authority, Buckley v. Cox, 122
Utah 151, 247 P. 2d 277 (1952), it is clear that some
competent credible evidence was needed to support the
findings made by the trial court. In our case, since
there is no evidence, there can be no competent credible
evidence.
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CONCLUSION
The only evidence of Waiver is opposing counsel's
statement in his Brief.
Officers of the Bank would have been discharged
for the negligent misappropriation of depositors' funds
if they had paid the invoices as though they were drafts.
There was no contract to pay invoices. Therefore, Space
Metals, Inc. could refuse to reimburse the Bank for the
volunteered payment claiming the materials were defective, not received, the payment not authorized, etc.
The Plaintiff would have been richer and the Bank's
depositors, stockholders and bonding Company poorer
and without recourse against Space Metals.
If a draft had been presented, the Bank would have
paid it immediately, not 30 days later, as it would be a
direct obligation of the Bank under the letter of credit.
The Bank could then provide for payment to the Bank
from Space Metals, Inc. under the agreements giving
rise to the letter of credit.
Since the Bank was not required to perform it had
no reason to obtain payment from its customer, Space
Metals, under the terms of its agreement with said Company.
Space Metals, Inc. is now insolvent, there would
have been no loss if Titanium Metals, Inc. had forwarded
drafts because the Bank would have paid and secured repayment from its then solvent customer. The failure to
provide drafts and its agreement extending time of pay-
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ment was solely Titanium Metal's responsibility and the
proximate cause of their loss. If a loss must be taken,
then the corporation who was not paid, because of its
failure to comply with simple contract terms must absorb the loss.
To hold otherwise, the Court must re-write the contract between the parties and shift the loss to an innocent
party. The Court must also create a very burdensome
appendage on the Law Merchant which would substantially inhibit the flow of commerce.
The Plaintiff, a knowledgable and sophisticated foreign corporation, has tried to shift the loss incurred
through its negligence to the Bank, who was playing
the game by the established rules. There is neither legal,
equitable or moral support for cause.
It is respectfully submitted that the decision of the
District Court should be reversed and a Judgment of no
cause of action entered.
Respectfully submitted,
BIELE, HASLAM & HATCH
Attorneys for Appellants
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